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Clearing Credit Default Swaps: A Case Study in Global
Legal Convergence
Anupam Chander* and Randall Costa**
In the wake of the global financial crisis, American and European
regulators quickly converged on a reform intended to help stave off similar
crises in the future: central counterparty clearinghouses for credit default swaps.
On both sides of the Atlantic, regulators identified credit default swaps (CDS) as
a central factor in the crisis that seized Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers,
American International Group (AIG), and ultimately the world.' Regulators
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CDS became a central culprit in the popular press as well. See Janet Morrissey, Credit Default
Swaps:
The
Next
Crisis,
Time
Magazine
(Mar
17,
2008)
online
at
http://www.time.com/time/business/article/0,8599,1723152,00.htrnl (visited Dec 1, 2009); Steve
Kroft, The Bet That Blew Up Wall Street, CBS News (Aug 27, 2009), online at
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2008/10/26/60minutes/main4546199.shtn?tag=contentMai
n;contentBody (visited Dec 1, 2009) (CDS were "the bet that blew up Wall Street. The TNT was
the collapse of the housing market and the failure of complicated mortgage securities that the big
investment houses created and sold around the world ... But the rocket fuel was the trillions of
dollars in side bets on those mortgage securities, called 'credit default swaps."') (quoting New
York Insurance Superintendent Eric Dinallo); Nicholas Varchaver and Katie Benner, The $55
Trillion Question, Fortune Magazine (Sept 30, 2008), online at http://money.cnn.com
/2008/09/29/magazines/fortune/varchaverderivatives.fortune/index.htm (visited Dec 1, 2009)
("[T]error at the potential for a financial Ebola virus radiating out from a failing institution and
infecting dozens or hundreds of other companies-all linked to one another by CDS and other
instruments-was a major reason that regulators stepped in to bail out Bear Stearns and buy out
AIG, whose calamitous descent itself was triggered by losses on its CDS contracts."); Gretchen
Morgenson, The Reckoning: How the Thundering Herd Faltered and Fell, The New York Times (Nov
18, 2008), online at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11 /09/business/O9magc.html?page
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quickly agreed that improving the conditions under which CDS are traded,
specifically, the addition of a central counterparty in clearing, would prove a key
reform to the global financial architecture. Introducing a well-capitalized central
counterparty between CDS buyers and sellers would, regulators came to believe,
help contain financial failures in the future.
How and why did this convergence occur? This Article reviews the
American and European responses, concluding that they converged on a similar
clearing structure largely because of its compelling logic. The financial crisis
revealed the vulnerabilities of a system in which buyers and sellers entered into
CDS directly, through bilateral contracts. These bilateral derivatives contracts
created a web of interconnected obligations, such that the failure of one firm
could bring down a chain of others. The threat of this domino effect led
governments to intervene in the financial markets with massive direct and
indirect support. Forced to spend public money to bail out private firms,
regulators risked an unsustainable moral hazard-firms that were "Too
Interconnected to Fail." Regulators concluded that the introduction of a central
counterparty (CCP) would reduce the risk that the bankruptcy of a principal in a
credit default swap would precipitate a domino fall through the credit markets.
The immediate focus on CDS as the crisis unfolded was understandable.
When the credit crisis struck in the fall of 2008, there were $57 trillion in
outstanding notional amount of CDS.2 In each of the preceding three years, the
amount of CDS had nearly doubled.3 In 2004, positions in CDS stood at $4.5
trillion.4 The market for CDS had grown virtually overnight, largely outside
regulatory scrutiny.
Because of the possibility of regulatory arbitrage, there is a case not just for
CCP clearing but also for regulatory convergence or harmonization. America's
single most expensive bailout was to AIG-for bad bets placed in London.5 As

2

wanted=1 (visited Dec 1, 2009) (arguing that credit default swaps were a major catalyst of the
financial crisis).
Bank for International Settlements, Quarterly Report: International Banking and Financial Market
Developments A103 (Dec 2008).

3

Id at 32 (noting, in December 2008, "an average six-month growth rate for outstanding CDS
contracts over the last three years of 45%').

4

Bank for International Settlements, Triennial Central Bank Survy 2007: Foreign Exchange and
Derivatives MarketActivity in 2007, 24 (Dec 2007), online at http://www.bis.org/pubI/rpfxf07t.pdf
(visited Dec 1, 2009) ("Positions in credit derivatives stood at $51 trillion at end-June 2007,
compared to $4.5 trillion in the 2004 survey.").

5

AIG
Blames
Its
London
Office,
Forbes
(Mar
13,
2009),
online
at
http://www.forbes.com/2009/03/13/aig-london-losses-markets-equity-insurance.htn-www.
forbes.com%20 (visited Dec 1, 2009) ("AIG Financial Products, run by now-infamous Joe
Cassano has been identified as the epicenter of AIG's problems.'); Former Head OfAIG sFinandal
Products Unit May Be Indicted For Securities Fraud, Post Online (Sept 11, 2009), online at
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one account puts it, "Ground zero for AIG's spectacular implosion, which has
soaked up more federal bailout money than any other entity, appears to have
been a small London branch office that may have put as much as half a trillion
dollars at risk."6 A common regulatory path is likely crucial to the success of the
reform. In 2007, some 42 percent of the turnover in all over-the-counter (OTC)
derivatives took place in the UK, with only a quarter in the US.' Differential
regulation would encourage regulation shopping, thus allowing for the possibility
of regulatory evasion.
That transatlantic convergence seems to have emerged is all the more
noteworthy because there were other prominent options available to regulators.
Regulators faced at least five options: (1) do nothing, or merely increase
reporting and monitoring, so as not to interfere with the private financial
markets; 8 (2) ban CDS entirely as too risky; (3) ban only "naked" CDS-where
the protection buyer does not hold the underlying security; 9 (4) regulate CDS as

6

http://www.postonine.co.uk/reinsurance/news/1 533252/former-head-aig-financial-productsunit-indicted-securities-fraud (visited Dec 1, 2009) ("US prosecutors are considering indicting the
former head of AIG's financial products unit for securities fraud, the Wall Street Journal has
reported..."); Peter Koeing, AIG Trail Leads To London 'Casino, Telegraph (Oct 18, 2008), online
at
http://wxv.telegraph.co.uk/finance/financetopics/financialcrisis/3225213/MG-trail-leadsto-London-casino.html (visited Dec 1, 2009) ("By the end of last year AIG held $562bn of CDS
contracts on its books, and in their October 7 testimony before the House Oversight Committee
company executives acknowledged that a cockpit for this business was [the London base of AIG
subsidiary AIG Financial Products] .... "); Richard Northedge, AIG London Unit Not Regulated By
FSA, The Independent (Mar 15, 2009), online at http://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/
news/aig-london-unit-not-regulated-by-fsa-1645223.html (visited Dec 1, 2009) ("AIG . . . has
admitted that toxic assets bought by its London office caused its problems. While questioning
claims that the UK operation lost $500bn, AIG said: 'This small unit engaged in trades that nearly
brought down the company and its still-sound insurance business."').
Jay Shaylor, Lauren Pearle, and Tina Babarovic, AIG's Small London Office May Have Lost Big ABC
News (Mar 10, 2009), online at http://abcnews.go.com/Business/story?id=7045889&page=l
(visited Dec 1, 2009).

7

Richard Roberts, The City: A Guide to London's Global FinancialCentre 89 (Bloomberg 2d ed 2008).
Note that these figures include all OTC derivatives, including interest rate and exchange rate
derivatives, not just credit default swaps.
Peter J. Wallison, Financial Services Outlook: Unnecessary Intervenlion: The Administraion's Effort to
Regulate Credit Default 1 (American Enterprise Institute 2009) ("[T]here is no sound policy reason
to impose the costs of regulation on a derivatives market that cannot create a systemic breakdown
and that has functioned effectively without such regulation for over twenty-five years.').
US Congressman Collin Peterson sponsored a bill (subsequently withdrawn) that would ban all
trading of CDS contracts unless the protection buyer owned the underlying reference asset. See
Derivatives Markets Transparency and Accountability Act of 2009, HR 977, 11 1th Cong 1st Sess
§ 13 (2009).
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insurance; ° and (5) regulate how CDS are cleared. In the wake of the financial
crisis, regulators across Europe and the US quickly focused on the last optionCDS clearing and settlement.
We are hardly the first to observe the emergence of a growing consensus
on the need to reform clearing for CDS." Our contribution is to trace the
process by which the consensus occurred and to attempt to explain why it
occurred. A review of developments in the clearing of CDS becomes a case
study in global governance. It reveals one process by which countries on both
sides of an ocean have moved, in fits and starts, towards a single solution to a
shared problem. We focus here on the regulation of CDS in the US and the EU,
though there is CDS trading in other jurisdictions as well. In Japan, for example,
there is also movement towards central counterparty clearing for CDS. 2
Our analysis proceeds as follows: Section I introduces credit default swaps
and compares bilateral clearing with central counterparty clearing. Section II
traces the US regulatory response to CDS clearing in the wake of the credit
crisis, and Section III follows with the European regulatory response. Section IV
assesses why regulators on both sides of the Atlantic turned to CDS clearing as
one key reform in the wake of the financial crisis.
I. CREDIT DEFAULT SWAPS AND CLEARING: AN
INTRODUCTION
A CDS is a contract between a protection buyer and a protection seller. A
CDS transfers the risk that an issuer of debt will default on its debt obligations.
The protection buyer makes periodic payments to the protection seller in
exchange for the protection seller's promise to make the buyer whole on an
agreed, or "notional," amount of the reference entity's debt in the event of a

10

Leah Campbell and Robin Choi, State Initiatives To Regulate Credit Default Swaps Deferred Pending
FederalAction(Sept 1, 2009), online at http://www.metrocorpcounsel.com/current.php?artType=
view&EntryNo=10049 (visited Dec 1, 2009).

11

From the Editor, 29(4) Futures & Derivatives L Rep 3 (Apr 2009) ("Regulation of Credit Default
Swaps-A global consensus has emerged among financial market regulators that CDS should be
more transparent and centrally cleared . . . ."); Gert Wehinger, Lessons from the FinandalMarket
Turmoil."ChallengesAheadfor the FinancalIndustry and Poliy Makers 1, 17-19 (OECD 2008), online at
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/47/25/41942918.pdf (visited Dec 1, 2009) (relating various
reform proposals by the industry as well as official authorities and international standard-setting
bodies, which arrive at similar conclusions regarding causes of and remedies for the crisis).
Tokyo Financial Exchange Inc, Study Committee on Central Counterpar for OTC Derivatives
Transactions: Summagy
(Apr 2009),
online
at
http://www.tfx.co.jp/en/newsfdle/pdf/
cdearing200904 e.pdf (visited Dec 1, 2009).

12
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specified credit event such as a bankruptcy, failure to pay, or debt restructuring
by the reference entity."
The buyer may use a CDS to hedge credit risk in a portfolio, both specific
to a given issuer (in the case of a "single name" CDS) or more broadly to a
grouping of investment grade or high yield issuers (in the case of a "corporate
index" CDS). Financial investors are common buyers of protection against
credit risks held in a bond portfolio. A corporate buyer might buy protection on
a counterparty with which it has a supply contract, to hedge the risk of the
default of that counterparty, or on a sector with which it deals, to hedge its
exposure to that sector. Alternatively, a CDS buyer need not be hedging risk in
an underlying investment; it may simply seek to position itself to profit in case
the reference entity or index defaults or is viewed by the market as having an
increasing risk of default (since this will increase the value of the protection
contract the buyer has entered into).
The seller, on the other hand, may use the CDS to gain credit exposure to
an issuer or sector, in exchange for a premium, in a way similar to an investor's
assumption of credit risk in taking bond exposure. Both dealers and non-dealer
investors, corporations or other "buy-side" participants may buy and sell CDS
protection.
A CDS transaction is structured as a swap. The buyer of protection in the
swap makes periodic payments to the seller over the agreed term of the swap
(heavily traded tenors tend to be five years, but tenors range from one to ten
years in standardized trading). In return, the seller commits to make the buyer
whole on the notional value of the amount protected in the event of a credit
event within that term. At the time of inception of the contract, in principle, the
present value of the stream of periodic payments equals the default probabilityadjusted value of the loss on which the seller would make the buyer whole. For
example, an investor's periodic payment for a CDS on the investment grade debt
of a highly rated reference entity might be 100 basis points (bps) annually, or 1.0
percent of the notional. This is the "spread" or "premium."
If, during the term of the CDS, the reference entity defaults on its debt, the
seller is obligated to make the buyer whole in the amount of the original notional
value of debt "insured." The parties may elect either cash settlement or physical
delivery. For cash settlement, the seller will pay the buyer in cash the difference
between the notional amount and the current value of the defaulted debt (an
industry-standard auction mechanism has evolved to determine this value).' 4 For
13

The "reference entity" is the issuer of the underlying debt.

14

International

Swaps and Derivatives Association, Inc, Auction Hardwiing online at
http://www.isda.org/companies/auctionhardwiring/auctionhardwiring.html
(visited Dec 1,
2009). See also Nishul Saperia, Credit Event Auction Primer, online at http://www.
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physical settlement, the buyer will deliver the defaulted debt in return for the
payment by the seller of the full notional at par. For example, if the swap
notional is $100 million and the recovery value of the reference entity's defaulted
debt is 40 percent, then the seller can cash settle the swap for $60 million.
Alternatively, the seller can pay $100 million to the buyer in return for the
original $100 million of the debt, which now has a market value of only $40
million.
CDS are transacted with reference to the following categories of credit risk:
corporate single names;15 corporate indices; 1 6 mortgage-backed securities (MBS)
and collateralized debt obligations (CDO);'7 and loans.' 8 Corporate single names
and corporate indices account for nearly 90 percent of the outstanding notional
value and 95 percent of the traded CDS volume.' 9
The corporate CDS market has matured such that the bulk of corporate
CDS on single names and indices are highly standardized. Traders in corporate
CDS now principally negotiate on price and quantity. Corporate CDS have
standard contract terms for the reference entity, debt seniority and security,
credit events, coupon payment dates, coupon premiums as a percent of notional
amounts, and maturity dates. This is analogous to centrally cleared equity
options where the traded contracts have standard protocols for underlying stock,
strike price, expiration date, and option type. This standardization has
accompanied and supported the growth of CDS.
The price of a CDS is defined in reference to the premium described
above. In the example above, at the time the contract is entered into, the market
view of the risk of default of the reference entity leads the parties to agree that
100 bps is the appropriate premium to compensate a seller of protection for its
promise to make the buyer whole in the event of a default (indicating a very low,
but not zero, probability of default). If after an interval of time the market view
is that the risk of default has increased, the cost of that protection will rise,

15

creditfixings.com/information/affiliations /fixings /auctions /dcs /credit-event
df (visited Dec 1, 2009).
Covers debt on corporate debt issuers.

auction-primer.p

16

Covers debt on a composite of corporate entities in a single "index" (for example, Markit CDX
IG index is comprised of debt on 125 North American investment grade corporate entities).

17

Covers default on MBS and CDO (CDS covering MBS are sometimes referred to as Asset
Backed Credit Default Swap, or ABCDS).
Covers default on loans.

18
19

Depository Trust & Clearing Corporation, D77C DerivISERV Trade Information Warehouse Reports
(2009), online at http://www.dtcc.com/products/derivserv/data/index.php (visited Dec 1, 2009)
(reporting Trade Information Warehouse data on gross notional values through May 2009, where
the new trade volume reported is annualized).
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indicatively to 102 bps. 20 The value of the buyer's swap has now increased. If it
were to sell the protection it has to a third party, or were to enter into an
offsetting contract, it would recognize a profit of 2 bps, over the life of the
contract, versus the price it is paying to the original seller of protection. Put
another way, if its contract with the first seller were suddenly terminated, and the
buyer needed to find replacement protection, it would now need to pay 102 bps
instead of 100 bps.
The market value of a CDS is thus different than the notional value.
Continuing the illustration above, a buyer buys two years of protection on $100
million investment grade corporate credit at 100 bps. The contract obliges the
buyer then to pay the seller a total premium over the two-year life of the
contract of $2 million ($100 million x 1.00% x 2 years). If the cost of such
protection moves to 102 bps (because the risk of default has increased), that
total premium would be $2.04 million. If the buyer were to trade out of the
contract, it would realize a profit of $40,000. Put another way, if the seller
wished to stop providing protection on the $100 million to the buyer, it would
need to pay the buyer $40,000 because the buyer would need to pay this amount
in turn to another seller to secure replacement protection.21
A. CDS Versus Bonds
In the span of a decade, the corporate CDS market came to rival the bond
markets in size and liquidity. In June 2008, there were $23.9 trillion in
international bonds and notes outstanding and $60.8 trillion in domestic debt
securities outstanding compared to $57 trillion notional amount outstanding of
CDS. 22 This growth appears to be in part because CDS are, in many ways,
simpler to trade than bonds from both an operational and financing perspective.
First, a given bond issuer, or CDS reference entity, will typically issue numerous
series of bonds, each with different coupons and other characteristics. Any entity

21

Historically when bilateral counterparties agreed to a CDS, a new premium was set for each trade,
depending on the parties' agreement on the discounted cash flows discussed earlier. As of
October 8, 2009, this constantly varying coupon was standardized into set coupons of 100bps and
500bps with upfront cash payments exchanged between each party to reflect the difference
between those standard coupons and the implied market price at the time of trade. Legacy
irregular coupons can be converted into a combination of 100bps and 500bps contracts for the
same outstanding notional and same premia. This standardization was a significant step for
facilitating central clearing. The standardization terms were reflected in the ISDA "Big Bang"
Protocol. See International Swaps and Derivatives Association, Frequenty Asked Quesions, online at
http://www.isda.org/media/ (follow the "Big Bang Protocol, and then the "FAQ" links) (visited
Dec 1, 2009).
For simplicity, this example does not take into account any discount for the time value of money.

22

Bank for International Settlements, Quarterly Report at A91, A96, A103 (cited in note 2).

20
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trading these bonds must price them individually in light of these characteristics
and must also arrive at a price that isolates and then recombines the interest rate
and credit components of the instrument. CDS, by contrast, are not limited to
one bond issue but are transacted with reference to the credit of a class of bonds
of the reference entity as a whole and are valued exclusively with reference to the
credit component. For example, at the moment of writing, IBM has twenty-one
different bond issuances outstanding, but there is one IBM CDS actively
traded.23 The focus on the corporation class of debt as a whole rather than upon
a single bond issuance is justifiable because cross-default provisions typically
bind together classes of debt of a reference entity. Credit default swaps thus
offer a market mechanism to price and transact in the pure credit risk of a
reference entity.
From a financing perspective, an investor in bonds must finance the entire
purchase of the bonds. This typically means first working through the
operational steps to settle the purchase of the bonds and then to make a pledge
arrangement, either of the bonds themselves or other securities, to collateralize
the cash borrowed to pay for the bonds. The financing cost for a purchase of
bonds will be the difference between the yield of the bonds (again a composite
function of both interest rate and credit risk) and the yield of the US Treasuries
or similar instruments posted by the investor to collateralize the financing, plus
the capital cost of cash for any portion of the bond purchase that is not
financed.24 By contrast, the CDS allows an investor to be exposed to effectively
the same credit risk or reward (eliminating any interest-rate risk component) but
only through the cost of financing the initial margin on the transaction, normally
a relatively small percentage of the total notional amount ("initial margin" is
discussed further in Section I.B). 2' The cost of financing the derivative exposure
is therefore typically less than the cost of financing bond exposure, while both
carry the same credit risk. This increased leverage has also helped drive growth
in the CDS markets. As The Economist magazine noted in April 2008, "the CDS

23

24

25

Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, Corporate Bonds Search Results (Nov 15, 2009), online at
http://cxa.marketwatch.com/finra/BondCenter/QuickScreener.aspx?ShowResult=true&BondTy
pe=Corporate&Symbol=ibm&YieldMin=&YieldMax=&CouponMin=&CouponMax=&Maturity
Min=&MaturityMax (visited Dec 1, 2009).
See Kevin Baldwin, Making Sense of Credit Default Swaps 11 (May 12, 2009), online at
http://www.futuresindustry.org/downloads/CDS%20Webinar.pdf (visited Dec 1, 2009).
George Soros, The New Paradigmfor FinancialMarkets xix (2008) ("To hold ordinary bonds requires
a margin of 10 percent; synthetic bonds created by credit default swaps can be traded on a margin
of 1.5 percent."). For more detail on pricing and payment flows of CDS, see Kevin Baldwin,
Making Sense of Credit Default Swaps (CDS) 5-12 (May 12, 2009), online at
http://www.futuresindustry.org/downloads/CDS/20Webinar.pdf (visited Dec 1, 2009).
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has become the product of choice for those investing in credit as an asset
class."2 6
While there is credit exposure to the reference entity in both a CDS and a
bond, there is an additional layer of counterparty risk in a CDS contract. A buyer
and a seller of a CDS each bear counterparty risk to each other for the duration
of the CDS. The seller of protection depends on the buyer to make the agreed
periodic payments during the term of the CDS. The buyer of protection
reciprocally depends on the seller to make good on its promise to purchase the
defaulted debt at its full face value if the reference entity defaults during the term
of the CDS. By contrast, the purchase by an investor of a bond from a bond
dealer does not carry long-term counterparty risk between the investor and the
bond dealer. The counterparty risk in that bond purchase contract between the
investor and bond dealer is limited only to the short interval between the time
that the contract is executed and the date of settlement-after that point, the
contract is settled with the cash exchanged between the buyers and sellers of the
bond.
B. Margin and Regulatory Capital
A counterparty to a CDS, whether a buyer or a seller of protection,
assesses the likelihood that the reference entity will default. The price paid for
CDS protection reflects the parties' view of that risk. However, because the
buyer and seller enter into these contracts bilaterally, each party is also exposed
to the risk that its counterparty might default.
There are two primary methods of reserving against losses arising in the
event of a counterparty default: regulatory capital and margin. 2' Regulatory
capital is unimpaired equity that must be held on the balance sheet of regulated
entities such as banks and broker dealers. Margin, which is generally cash or cash
equivalents and is sometimes referred to as "collateral," is of two types:
"variation margin" and "initial margin."
Variation margin (also called "mark-to-market margin") is paid in cash and
is exchanged between the parties to reflect current exposure, or ongoing changes
in market value of the swap. Variation margin thus allows the parties to account
for the fact that the market value of a CDS contract, like that of credit risk
implied in the market value of a bond, changes every day depending on the
market's assessment of probability of default and a range of other factors. As
noted above, this change in value results in a change in the spread or premium

26

Swap Shop, The Economist 92 (Apr 26, 2008).

27

Counterparty exposure can also be reduced by hedging with CDS (for example, by buying CDS
protection on your counterparty).
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charged for protection in the marketplace. As the spread moves, the value of a
given CDS between two parties changes, calculated as the present value of the
change in spread over the remaining term of the swap. The parties to the swap
exchange an amount equal to this calculated change in value versus the prior
day. This payment of variation margin is intended to provide that in the event a
party defaults, the other party is whole up to that time in the market value of the
swap it holds. In the example of a CDS given above, the change in value as the
premium moved from 100bps to 102bps was $40,000. This would be the
amount of variation margin that would be paid by the party against whom the
market had moved to the party in whose favor it moved.
Initial margin is collected at the onset of the swap and held against
potential future exposure in the event the depositing party defaults. Initial
margin is typically a small fraction of the notional amount, and is intended to
protect one party to the CDS from contract price movement for a certain period
after a default of the other party, and during which the defaulting party would
no longer pay mark-to-market. This period of initial margin coverage is intended
to cover this mark-to-market value variation until the non-defaulting party can
enter into an offsetting transaction to neutralize its exposure. Initial margin acts
effectively as a deposit until the end of the swap, at which time it is returned to
the payor if there has been no default of the payor.
Regulatory capital is capital held by a capital-supervised entity on its
balance sheet to reserve against losses in that entity's investments. It is not,
therefore, exchanged between bilateral counterparties, but serves as a protection
for the regulated entity's counterparts. If a counterparty faces a well-capitalized
entity, it can expect that losses in that entity's portfolio are cushioned by a
reserve of capital that can be drawn on to meet that entity's obligations. Capitalsupervised entities are subject to guidelines for calculating capital, the goal of
which is to ensure that the capital is sufficient, liquid, unimpaired, and not
vulnerable to sudden losses. This imposes an opportunity cost on the capitalsupervised entity, which is required to hold capital in conservative form-for
example, in the form of US Treasuries rather than in riskier or less liquid
investments with higher returns.
C. CDS Market Structure
Large commercial banks first developed CDS to transfer the credit risk
component of a commercial debt portfolio. The market rapidly adopted CDS as
an efficient and now substantially standardized instrument for transferring credit
risk. Dealers, typically major Wall Street banks, are in current market practice on
at least one side of every trade. In part, this reflects simply the dealers' role in
making markets generally-the dealers are professional intermediaries with the
infrastructure and business models to offer their counterparties a range of
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contracts at prices that are continuously updated to reflect market developments.
Investors have also historically preferred to trade with dealers for counterparty
credit reasons: In periods of stability, investors viewed regulated institutions as
having minimal risk of defaulting; investors disfavored other firms because
investors lacked the information to assess the credit risk of such firms.
Participants also tend to have negotiated documentation for CDS already in
place with dealers, making further transactions with them easier.
A market structure where a dealer is on one side of every trade confers
informational advantages to dealers. Dealers see volumes of actual and intended
trades from their "buy-side" customers and also make inter-dealer trades to take
on or lay off risk according to supply and demand. Therefore, dealers have the
best view of current market value in a market where all transactions are private
and bilateral with no actual transaction prices published. Customers, on the
other hand, must engage in a series of bilateral conversations with dealers to gain
pricing information. Given this asymmetry of information in their favor, dealers
have an incentive to preserve the status quo in the market structure.
D. OTC Bilateral CDS Trade Flows
As noted, in the current bilateral, privately negotiated OTC CDS market,
dealers are on one side of every trade. Because investors have historically viewed
dealers (being capital-supervised entities) as secure counterparty credit risks,
dealers do not customarily post initial margin. In transactions between
customers-buy-side firms such as pension funds, hedge funds, corporations,
and other investors-and dealers, the buy-side counterparties typically do post
initial margin to the dealer. Dealers may offer an exception for certain corporate
"end-users"--dealers may instead take unsecured risk to these end-users, or may
accept illiquid collateral, for example, business assets, to secure potential
counterparty exposure. Assuming that no dealer ever defaults, this asymmetry is
not problematic in principle. However, the crisis of 2008 revealed significant
vulnerabilities in this market structure.
First, AIG and Lehman, both highly regulated, capital-supervised entities,
proved insufficiently capitalized to avoid default. While these were large, multistrategy institutions with potential capital shortfalls with respect to strategies
other than derivatives, each institution defaulted not only because of losses on
specific derivatives positions, but also because it could not meet its cash markto-market (variation margin) obligations to its bilateral counterparties.
Second, in the case of AIG, it became apparent that the bilateral, private,
and unregulated character of the market had allowed AIG's dealer counterparties
to relax their margin rules, relying in part on AIG's overall high credit ratings
and perceived balance sheet strength. Indeed, AIG's counterparties allowed AIG
an exemption from both initial margin and variation margin payments. Had AIG
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faced this margin discipline, it might not have taken on excess risk, and its
counterparties would have suffered far lower losses even if AIG did default,
since they would have been current through variation margin and would have
had the buffer of initial margin while resolving their open positions.
Third, as became evident in the wake of the Lehman failure, when a buyside firm posts initial margin to a dealer in the current market structure, that
margin is not held in trust or in some other way segregated from the assets of
the dealer. It is instead commingled with the dealer's working capital, and thus
subject to bankruptcy of the dealer.28 Because of this risk, as word that Lehman
might be facing a cash crisis spread, counterparties rushed to try to protect
themselves from having their margin trapped, either suddenly closing out
positions or demanding margin in turn from Lehman. This exacerbated
Lehman's cash shortfall (and the same occurred for a range of financial
institutions during the crisis period). There may be billions in initial margin
trapped in Lehman's bankruptcy. 29 Bilateral counterparties to Lehman that had
offsetting trades to their trades to Lehman were left without incoming variation
margin to pay their offsetting variation margin obligations. This helped
propagate Lehman's default through the markets, with the counterparties of
Lehman's counterarties harmed by Lehman's default. While the authorities
allowed Lehman to fail, when, within days, AIG teetered, the authorities feared
that the interconnected losses that would ensue would be too systemically
damaging. The Federal Reserve therefore bailed out AIG (and newspaper stories

28

29

President and Chief Executive Officer, Managed Funds Association Richard H. Baker, Letter to
PresidentGeithner, Chairman Cox and ChairmanLukken (Dec 19, 2008). Here Baker states that:
The purpose of initial margin is to provide dealers with a cushion against the
potential counterparty risk they assume when entering into an OTC derivatives
contract with a customer. However, such margin is not typically segregated
from the dealers' other unsecured assets, what is supposed to be a credit
mitigant for the dealer instead subjects the customer to actual credit risk on
the posted amounts. If a dealer becomes insolvent, initial margin posted by
customers that is not so segregated is treated in bankruptcy as a general
unsecured claim of the customer. As a result, customers who are
counterparties to that dealer stand to incur significant losses, regardless of the
current value of their derivatives contracts.
The Managed Funds Association ("MFA") estimates more than $50 billion in customer assets
held by Lehman's European affiliate, though the MFA does not identify what portion represents
margin. See Capital Markets Regulatory Reform: Strengthening Investor Protection, Enhancing
Oversight of Private Pools of Capital, and Creating a National Insurance Office, Hearing before
the Committee On Financial Services of the US House Of Representatives, 111th Cong, 1st Sess
15 n18 (Oct 6, 2009) (testimony of President and Chief Executive Officer, Managed Funds
Association
Richard
H.
Baker)
online
at
http://www.managedfunds.org/
downloads/mfa%20testimon 5 /o20october/o206%20final.pdf (visited Dec 1, 2009) ("We believe
that there is in excess of $50,000,000,000 in customer assets still being held in Lehman Brothers
International (Europe) ("LBIE") ... 'D.
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followed, explaining how bailout funds flowed directly to counterparties to meet
margin cals on AIG's CDS contracts with them).
As we will see, counterparties to Lehman's centrally cleared futures
transactions fared far better. But two other features of bilateral market structure
should be noted. First, as the AIG case illustrated, the initial margin to be paid
by the customer to the dealer is a matter of contractual negotiation and, in many
respects, reflects market power and economics of the trade between the two
parties, not just the intrinsic risk properties of the transaction or necessarily even
the probability of counterparty default of the customer. In some cases, like AIG,
customer reward, unanalyzed assumptions about the customer's balance sheet,
or excessive reliance on rating agency findings could lead to assessment of
insufficient initial margin. Alternatively, in times of market stress, dealers could
demand excessive margin, knowing that customers may not readily be able to
replace counterparties in the bilateral market (and do not want to sacrifice
netting benefits they may secure when facing the same counterparty with
multiple offsetting transactions). Such demands could strain the cash supply for
the buy-side, leading to a negative spiral in trading activity that was not
necessarily warranted by actual risk levels.
Second, variation margin and, to the extent adjustable, initial margin, are
determined based on market pricing. But as noted, there is no source in the
current market for actual transaction prices, and so there is variability, based on
individual dealer trading desk pricing, in the establishment of prices at which
margin is fixed. The lack of price transparency in the bilateral market can thus
lead to too much or too little margin being assessed at any given time.
E. Centrally Cleared CDS Trade Flows
By contrast to the bilateral trade flows described above, in a centrally
cleared trade, the bilateral trade between a seller of protection and a buyer of
protection is replaced with two swaps: one between the seller and the CCP as
buyer and an equal and offsetting trade between the buyer and the CCP as
seller.3 ° The two market participants may first enter into a bilateral trade and
then elect subsequently to convert it into a cleared trade. Alternatively, the
participants may enter into a trade from the outset with the intention that it be
cleared. If the trade is promptly accepted for clearing, the parties may have
minimal to no bilateral exposure to each other. Once the trade is cleared, if one
market participant defaults, the other market participant is not directly affected,
since its counterparty is now exclusively the clearinghouse. CCP clearing thus
30

While other clearinghouses may also facilitate processing and netting of trades, a central
counterparty clearinghouse also takes on the full obligations of a counterparty, promising to
perform the obligations on one side of the CDS, through the duration of the CDS contract.
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replaces the "Too Interconnected to Fail" market structure with a hub and
spoke where, if one spoke fails, it does not affect the other spokes. These
structures are illustrated by the figures below (the circles at the periphery
representing CDS buyers and sellers).

Figure 1: Bilateral Market-Too
Interconnected to Fail

Figure 2: Central Counterparty Clearing

From the CCP's point of view, so long as the two parties to their precisely
offsetting trades perform, the CCP has no market risk. The CCP must however
provide for the case where a market participant fails. The CCP's core function is
to act as a risk manager by administering safeguards against this possibility. It
does this through a combination of counterparty risk assessment and
requirements, margin assessment and position oversight, and default
mutualization and management facilities.
First, a CCP transacts with a limited number of clearing members (CM),
typically sophisticated financial firms that act in a principal and usually, but not
always, financial intermediary capacity. CMs are typically regulated institutions,
but need not be. The CCP establishes minimum capital and operational
requirements for CMs. The CCP has procedures in place for ongoing assessment
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of a CM's credit strength and has discretion to impose limits on the CM's
activity based on that assessment. 31
Second, for every cleared transaction entered into by CMs, each CM must
post both initial margin and variation margin, determined on a neutral basis by
the risk management department of the CCP. 32 The CCP continuously monitors
each CM's positions and has discretion both to increase margin and to impose
position limits. Prices used for establishing margin are calculated by the CCP
based on actual transaction price data, third party pricing sources, and other
sources. The CCP is motivated to mark the transaction as close as possible to
the true market price in order to ensure it has adequate margin to cover its risk
on both sides of the trade. This process eliminates the pricing inefficiencies in
the bilateral market highlighted above for pricing for margin. In addition, CCPs
typically make the prices they use to establish margin, known as settlement
prices, publicly available, thus significantly enhancing price transparency versus
bilateral markets lacking any such central, objective price source.3 3 Increased
price transparency offers market participants a more precise view of the risk they
hold-allowing them to respond more efficiently to changes and thus reduce the
risk that they are unhedged. This, in turn, leads to systemic risk reduction.
Third, each CM must contribute capital to a default mutualization fund in
proportion to the risk it has outstanding with the CCP. The CM typically
commits to allow further funds to be called, and the CCP also places a certain
amount of its own capital at risk. In the event a CM defaults, the CCP
immediately takes over the defaulting CM's positions and the initial margin the
CCP held against those positions, and it proceeds to close them. The daily
variation margin discipline imposed by the CCP seeks to ensure that the
contracts are current at the time of default. The initial margin is intended to

31

32

33

See

ICE
Trust,
Clearing
Rules
8,
online
at
https://www.theice.com/publicdocs/clear-us/ICE TrustRules.pdf (visited Dec 1, 2009); for
CME,
see
CME
Group,
Financial
Safeguards
11,
online
at
http://www.cmegroup.com/clearing/files/financialsafeguards.pdf (visited Dec 1, 2009).
See, for example, CME Group, FinancialSafeguardsat 6 (cited in note 31).
Stephen G Cecchetti, Jacob Gyntelberg and Marc Hollanders, Central CounterpariesforOver-theCounter Derivatives, BIS Quarterly Review 45, 51 (Sept 2009) ("Introducing CCPs would improve
transparency by allowing for easy collection of high-frequency market-wide information on
market activity, transaction prices and counterparty exposures for market participants who rely on
them."). The CME's application to the CFTC for Section 4(d) account approval for CDS
describes CME's daily mark-to-market process and commitment to make publicly available open
interest and settlement price information for each cleared contract. See Lisa A. Dunsky, Petition to
Commingle CustomerFunds Used to Margin Credit Default Swaps Cleared j CME with OtherFunds Held in
Segregated Accounts CME Submission 6, 8, online at http://www.cftc.gov/ucm/groups/
public/@requestsandactions/documents/ifdocs/cme4drequestcds.pdf (visited Dec 1, 2009).
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cover losses during the period the CCP is closing out the contracts. In the event
the initial margin is insufficient for this purpose, losses on the contracts will be
made whole by drawing from the CCP's own capital at risk, and the
mutualization fund, which functions like an insurance pool, spreading the risk of
default among all CMs.
The CCP assesses a transaction fee for each trade cleared. The bulk of
collateral held by the CCP remains on the balance sheet of the posting
participants, with interest earned on such collateral paid to those participants.
A market participant need not be a CM to benefit from the CCP. If the
CCP framework allows, non-CMs may contract with CMs to clear contracts on
their behalf. The CM will establish credit limits and appropriate operational and
account arrangements to manage the non-CM's positions and ongoing trade
lifecycle obligations as a customer. The CCP will establish the initial margin for
the transaction, and will then assess ongoing variation margin (and adjustments
in initial margin). The CCP will make these assessments to the CM, who in turn
will require its customers to make the same payment. The CM will guarantee to
the CCP the obligations of its customer for its cleared trades. The CM will
charge a fee for this guarantee role to the non-CM and may also assess margin
from the customer in excess of the CCP-required level, particularly if the CM
views the customer as a higher credit risk. From the customer's perspective,
unlike in the bilateral market, the customer's positions and the initial margin
posted by the customer to its CM are segregated from the assets of the CM. This
arrangement means that, if the CM were to default due to its own positions, the
customer's positions and posted margin are immediately portable, allowing the
customer or the CCP to place the customer's positions and posted margin with
another, solvent CM.34 Thus, the CCP isolates the customer's margin from the
bankruptcy of the CM.

34

Under certain clearing arrangements, in the event a customer's default leads to its CM's default,
deposits of other non-defaulting customers may potentially be called on to fill any losses on
liquidation of the defaulting customer's positions. See Report to the Supervisors of the Major OTC
Derivatives Dealers on the Proposalsof CentralizedCDS Clearing Solutionsfor the Segregation and Portabilioof
Customer CDS Positions and Related Magin 29
June
30,
2009)
online
at
http://www.managedfunds.org/Default.asp (visited Dec 1, 2009) ("If the CM has commingled a
particular CDS customer's margin, not with proprietary assets of the CM, but instead with either
(i) other CDS customers' margin or (ii) the custodial property of the CM's other custodial
claimants (e.g., trust claimants holding property for safekeeping at the CM), such commingling is
not likely to affect the analysis of whether CDS customers have proprietary or contractual rights
to the margin-i.e., even if margin is commingled with other custodial property, CDS customers
should still have rights to such property superior to those of unsecured creditors of the insolvent
CM. However, it may affect the class of custodial claimants with whom the CDS customer may
be required to share in the event of a shortfall in custodial property.").
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The dealer CMs thus play essential capitalization and guarantee roles in the
CCP structure. The integrity of the CCP depends on the CCP continuously
monitoring the credit and capital strength of its CMs, and having robust legal
and security arrangements with them. For this reason, the CCP limits clearing
membership to firms that meet its capital and credit criteria. Nonetheless, the
benefits of clearing are available to all market participants through the agency of
the CMs. Further, for clearing of any OTC product like CDS that is not traded
on an exchange, the CCP must establish market pricing through analyzing a
range of pricing sources. While the CCP will register actual prices at which CDS
trade through the course of a trading day, and these prices will be effective for
determining settlement prices, for less frequently transacted CDS CCPs may
require dealers to provide prices at which they would be willing to transact such
CDS. Especially in the early stages of clearing a certain product, the CCPs are
reliant on dealer CMs to support the daily pricing process. Finally, dealer CMs
typically commit to participate in the default management processes of the CCP
in the event a CM defaults, including facilitating the transfer of the defaulting
CM's customer portfolios to solvent CMs and participating in an auction of the
defaulting CM's proprietary positions.
F. Lehman Futures: A CCP Success Story
At the time Lehman defaulted, Lehman was a major participant in both the
cleared futures markets, where it acted as principal and as CM for customers,
and in the bilateral OTC derivatives markets, where it faced dealer and customer
counterparties.35 The two market structures handled the default of a major
participant in strikingly contrasting ways. The rapid resolution of Lehman's
futures portfolios offered regulators an important example of the stability of

CCP clearing in a crisis.
When Lehman collapsed, its futures portfolios were resolved as follows:
The positions and margin of investors who cleared their futures
through the Lehman CM were, under CFTC rules applicable to the

35

See Dan Freed, Lehman Creditors Face Complex Unwind, TheStreet.com (Sept 16, 2008), online at
http://www.thestreet.com/story/10437520/2/lehman-creditors-face-complex-unwind.htn(visited Dec 1, 2009).
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CMs of the CCP,36 held isolated from Lehman's
bankruptcy, and
37
were moved within days to solvent CMs.
* Because of this segregation and portability based on CCP rules,
Lehman's customers suffered no loss in these portfolios nor was
there market liquidity impairment.
* The CCP immediately took over Lehman's proprietary futures
book and auctioned it to other market participants.
* The auction was successful in part because the auctioned futures
had a high level of liquidity and price transparency because they
were standardized and because auction participants were not
exposed to bilateral counterparty credit risk when bidding on these
centrally cleared products.
* Through the auction the CCP was able to sell off the Lehman
portfolio it had taken over. The margin reserves against the
Lehman portfolio were sufficient to cover the CCP's offsetting
obligations for the period it held the portfolio, such that there was
no loss to the clearinghouse or the mutualization fund (and thus by
definition no loss to the CMs other than Lehman whose deposits
were part of the mutualization fund), and there was also no
disruption of the futures market. 38 There was also no need for
subsidy or bailout by a government agency.
By contrast, the resolution of Lehman's bilateral OTC derivatives portfolios,
such as its CDS portfolio, has proved far more difficult:

36

Commodity Exchange Act § 4(d), 7 USC § 6(d) (2000); Commodity Futures Trading Commission,
Securities Representing Investment of Customer Funds Held in Segregated Accounts by Futures
Commission Merchants, 62 Fed Reg 42398-42399 (Sept 8, 1997) (amending CFTC rules "to
allow futures commission merchants to make direct transfers into segregated accounts of
permissible, unencumbered securities").

37

38

Will Acworth, The Lessons of Lehman: Reassessing Customer Protections, Futures Industry (Jan-Feb
2009), online at http://www.futuresindustry.org/fi-magazine-home.asp?a=1297 (visited Dec 1,
2009) (noting that "virtually all the futures and options contracts held by Lehman on behalf of its
customers were safely transferred out of the company within a single week of the bankruptcy
filing and the futures markets continued to function normally").
LCH.Clearnet, an Anglo-French clearinghouse, reportedly handled Lehman's $9 trillion interest
rate swap portfolio without a loss to the CCP. See LCH.Cleamet, SwapClear 6 (july 9, 2009),
online
at
http://www.ecb.int/events/pdf/conferences/ccp-cds2/SwapClear.pdf?
c3bc965de2993aldfb6ecb8285752087 (visited Dec 1, 2009); LCH.Clearnet, LCH.Clearnet
Successfully Manages Lehman Default (Sept 23, 2008), online at http://www.lchclearnet.com/images/
2008-09-23%/201ehman%20defaulttcm6-44143.pdf (visited Dec 1, 2009); Acworth, The Lessons of
Lehman at 36 ("LCH.Clearnet has stated publicly that it was able to wind down more than 66,000
Lehman swap transactions in less than month with the help of its SwapClear participants and with
no loss to the clearinghouse.").
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The positions and margin of counterparties, particularly investor
counterparties, were trapped in the Lehman bankruptcy estate,
particularly since it was normal for margin to be taken into
working capital of the dealers. Industry estimates suggest that there
are in excess of $50 billion in customer assets still held in the estate
and that it may take "over a decade" for recovery on those assets
to be paid.39
* The fear of losses and the entrapment of collateral just described
caused an effective "run" on Lehman to close out contracts and
recover margin in the days before it declared failure.
" Lehman defaulted on the web of interconnected contracts to
which it was a bilateral counterparty, sending shock waves through
the global financial system as counterparties sought to close
offsetting positions or otherwise limit their risk and losses. The
credit markets suffered significant volatility and uncertainty.4"
" In the run up before the default and in the confusion that
followed, regulators could not ascertain the extent of exposure and
potential loss associated with Lehman's bilateral OTC derivatives
contracts. 41 By contrast, the Lehman futures exposure was known
precisely because it was registered, in real time, with the CCP.
Regulators agree that higher capital levels must be imposed on non-cleared
products, but the challenge remains to establish what the right levels would have
been for Lehman and how they should be calibrated for the marketplace as a
whole. Regardless of Lehman's capitalization, the centrally cleared futures
markets demonstrated that a CCP's maintenance of initial and variation margin
discipline could help prevent a significant dealer participant's counterparties and
"

39

Lindsay Fortado and Tom Cahill, Lehman Ruling Delays Return of Funds by a 'Decade; Bloomberg
(Aug 21,
2009)
online at http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601208&sid
=aYMWyc3eend0 (visited Dec 1, 2009).

40

Mathew Goldstein and David Henry, Lehman: One Big Derivaives Mess, BusinessWeek (Oct 8,
2008), online at http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/08_42/b4104000160047.htm
(visited Dec 1, 2009) ("Lehman's bankruptcy threw into jeopardy derivative deals with a
staggering 8,000 different firms that had paid Lehman billions of dollars in collateral . .. [and]
push[ed] global short-term lending markets into a deep freeze"); see also Shannon Harrington,
Lehman Collapse Spurs Call for Credit Clearinghouse, Bloomberg (Sept 16, 2008), online at
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601110&sid=aKRxRwPBYCUg (visited Dec 1,
2009).

41

Harrington, Lehman Collapse Spurs Call for Credit Cleainghouse, Bloomberg (cited in note 40)
("Lehman, the first major market-maker to go bankrupt in the decade-long history of the privately
negotiated, unregulated business [of credit-default swaps] may leave behind billions of dollars in
potential losses for trading partners according to Barclays PLC of London. No one knows exactly
how much because there's no central exchange or system for recording trades.").
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the CCP from suffering losses on clearable positions. In addition, for Lehman's
futures portfolio, the CCP eliminated in two critical ways the "Too
Interconnected to Fail" problem. First, because Lehman's positions were
centrally cleared, Lehman's original transaction counterparties, such as, for
example, other dealers in dealer-to-dealer trades, were no longer its
counterparties at the time of default-they all faced the CCP, supported by the
CCP's margin regime and further aided, in the event that margin fell short, by
the CCP's mutualization funds. Second, Lehman's customers were isolated from
Lehman's insolvency-their positions and margin were portable and their
margin was not commingled with Lehman's working capital but immediately
available to continue to be held in reserve against each customer's transactions.
The fact that they had this security of isolation from Lehman's bankruptcy
meant that there was no "rush" on Lehman to close out futures positions or
seek additional margin as it showed credit difficulty-again the CCP
mechanisms served to remove an "interconnectedness" factor that exacerbated
credit stress in the bilateral markets.
In light of experiences with Lehman and earlier defaults of major market
participants, and the stability of CCPs through major market dislocations,
regulators have observed that regulated CCPs have been successful in providing
stability and ameliorating the "Too Interconnected to Fail" problem.42 As
consensus has grown regarding these benefits, including, especially, the
dispensation of the need for a governmental backstop to absorb default losses,
regulators have come to regard CCPs as critical to the future stability of the
derivatives markets. How and why regulators have come to this conclusion is the
subject of the next three parts.
II. THE EVOLUTION OF UNITED STATES DERIVATIVES
REGULATION
The convergence on CCP clearing for CDS represents an about-face from
the earlier American regulatory stance. Less than a decade earlier, Congress had
acted to largely deregulate CDS, explicitly exempting them from the Commodity

42

In 2006, Federal Reserve Governor Randall Kroszner lauded derivatives CCPs' track record with
respect to counterparty risk. See Randall S. Kroszner, Central Counterparty Clearing: Histoy,
Innovaion, and Regulalion (Speech at the European Central Bank and Federal Reserve Bank of
Chicago Joint Conference on Issues Related to Central Counterparty Clearing, Apr 3, 2006),
online at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/Kroszner2006043a.htm
(visited
Dec 1, 2009) ("[]t is hard to find fault with the track record of derivatives CCPs, many of which
have managed counterparty risk so effectively that they have never suffered a counterparty
default").
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Exchange Act (CEA), which generally governs derivatives.43 The CEA requires
that derivatives be traded through an exchange regulated by the Commodity
Futures Trading Commission (CFTC).44 In 2000, Congress passed the
Commodities Futures Modernization Act (CFMA), amending the CEA to
exclude OTC derivatives traded between certain eligible persons. 4' As one
commentator describes,
"In sum, in 2000 as a society we chose not to regulate
' 46
credit default swaps.
Why did we choose not to regulate CDS in 2000 and why in 2009 did we
do an about-face? The decision to forgo regulation was due to a belief that
regulation might stifle an important new American market in derivatives. This
did not mean that a market in derivatives would fail to develop, but that it would
develop overseas. Even if the US outlawed derivatives, a US company could still
purchase a derivative, even one referencing an American asset, by entering into
the transaction abroad. Deregulating these instruments would help the market
flourish within the US.
The CFMA largely enacted the recommendations of the President's
Working Group on Financial Markets (PWG). Led by the Treasury Secretary,
and including the chairmen of the SEC, the Federal Reserve, and the CFTC, the
PWG's views hold considerable sway in Washington. In 1999, the PWG
recommended that derivatives entered into bilaterally between "sophisticated
counterparties" should be exempt from regulation 4 7-either as securities or as
futures. The deregulatory move was prompted in part by the desire to avoid
losing the derivatives market to foreign shores: "Creating an exclusion from the
CEA for swaps agreements that are bilateral agreements between eligible parties
on a principal-to-principal basis" would, the PWG concluded, help make "the
U.S. a more attractive derivatives market." 48 While the CFTC had proposed a
concept release in 1998 that would have asserted its authority over the OTC

43

For a comprehensive history of pre-CFMA derivatives regulation in the US, noting the
overlapping jurisdiction granted to various regulatory agencies, consider Roberta Romano, The
PoliticalDynamics Of Deivaive Securities Regulation, 14 Yale J Reg 279 (1997); see also Frank Partnoy,
The Shifting Contours of GlobalDetivativesRegulation, 22 U PaJ Intl Econ L 421, 435-42 (2001).

44

Commodity Exchange Act ('CEA'), 7 USC §6.

45

CFMA at § 103.

46

Review the Role of Credit Derivatives in the U.S. Economy, Hearing before the House
Committee on Agriculture, (Nov 20, 2008) (testimony of New York State Insurance Department
Superintendent Eric Dinallo).

47

US Department of the Treasury, From the Office of Public Affairs: President's Working Group on
Financial Markets Releases Over-the-Counter Derivadves Report (Nov 9, 1999), online at
http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/ls224.htm (visited Dec 1,2009).

48

Id.

Winter 2010

ChicagoJournalofInternationalLaw

derivatives market, 49 it had previously treated these instruments as exempt. Both
this concept release and the possibility that the CEA might be read to apply to
OTC derivatives were potentially destabilizing to an OTC derivatives market
that had prospered outside regulatory oversight. The letter forwarding the PWG
report worried that "a cloud of legal uncertainty" hanging over the OTC
derivatives market in the US would, inter alia, "damage U.S. leadership in these
arenas by driving transactions off-shore."5 ° The letter was signed by Treasury
Secretary Lawrence H. Summers, SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt, Federal Reserve
Chairman Alan Greenspan, and CFTC Chairman William J. Rainer.
The threat of foreign competition was very much on the mind of Congress
when it considered the PWG's proposals in 2000. The bill's principal exponent,
Senator Phil Gramm, clearly stated the worry that strong regulation would drive
the derivatives markets offshore: "We have competition from all over the world
that would very much like to see this goose that lays the golden egg, these
financial markets, roosting in their coop. They are trying to do things to attract
it. They are unifying markets. They are reducing regulatory burden."'" Senator
Richard Lugar echoed this concern: 'We face competition in the world. There
are other people who are doing all sorts of things. 5 2 The ease of moving
derivatives transactions offshore was demonstrated to the Senate committees
considering the CFMA. Senator Lugar noted that "[i]n the course of our
hearings we had an electronic demonstration and transacted a trade right in front
of us on his computer on a European market . . . ,,5' The Clinton
Administration argued that failing to pass the bill "could result in the movement
of these markets to overseas locations with more updated regulatory regimes. 5 4
An ad-hoc coalition of investment banks including Morgan Stanley, Goldman
Sachs, Merrill Lynch, Citigroup, Credit Suisse and Chase Manhattan argued that
the bill would "prevent the flight of our domestic financial derivatives business

50

Commodities Futures Trading Commission, Over-the-Counter Derivaives (1998), online at
http://www.cftc.gov/opa/press98/opamntn.htm (visited Dec 1, 2009).
Over-the Counter Derivatives Markets and the Commodity Exchange Act: Report of the

51

President's Working Group on Financial Markets, US Department of the Treasury (Nov 9, 1999),
online at http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/docs/otcact.pdf (visited Dec 1, 2009) (Letter to
Dennis Hastert, Speaker of the House, US Representatives).
The Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000, Joint Hearing on S 2697 Before the
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Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry and the Committee on Banking, Housing, and
Urban Affairs 106 Cong 922, 4-5 (June 21, 2000).
Id.
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Executive Office of the President & Office of Management and Budget, Statement of
Administrative Policy (Oct 19, 2000) (reprinted in 146 Cong Rec E1939-02 (2000)).

49

Vol 10 No. 2

ClearingCreditDefault Swaps

Ghanderand Costa

abroad." 55 The Chicago Board of Trade and Chicago Mercantile Exchange put it
most directly in a joint letter: "A vote against the bill is a vote for London and
other foreign markets."5 6 The Act itself declared American financial
competitiveness to be a key aim: "to enhance the competitive position of US
financial institutions and financial markets. 5 7
It is useful to consider the concurrent regulatory landscape in the principal
alternative derivative jurisdiction, the UK. There, the Financial Services Act of
1986 and the Financial Services and Markets Act of 2000 had largely exempted
most derivatives transactions from regulatory purview. Rather than regulating
individual OTC derivative transactions, the UK imposed restrictions on which
parties were allowed to transact in OTC derivatives.5 8 Furthermore, the parties
were required to comply with the general regulatory requirements, including
maintaining capital and risk controls and disclosure of all OTC derivatives
positions to regulators.5 9 Also, parties transacting in OTC derivatives on behalf
of clients were required to ensure that client recommendations were suitable and
that appropriate risk warnings had been provided.6 °
In 2007, the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) studied the
possibility of expanding CCP clearing for OTC derivatives. The BIS report fell
short of strongly endorsing CCPs for credit derivatives, suggesting only that
central banks and supervisors consider whether "CCPs should be applied to
providers of clearing and settlement services for OTC derivatives that are not
already subject to those standards."'" The report noted the possibility of a trade
information warehouse instead of a full-fledged CCP clearing structure:
Through a trade information warehouse or otherwise, market participants
may seek to achieve the operational benefits of CCP clearing while
preserving decentralised counterparty credit risk management. CCP clearing
may also expand over time to encompass additional instruments, especially
55

56

57
58

59
60
61

Morgan Stanley Dean Winter, Goldman Sachs & Co. Inc., Citigroup Inc., The Chase Manhattan
Bank, Credit Suisse First Boston Inc., Chicago Mercantile Exchange & Chicago Board of Trade,
Letter to Rep. Larry Combest, Chairman, House Agriculture Committee, and Rep Tom Ewing,
Chairman, Agriculture Subcommittee on Risk Management (Oct. 18, 2000) (reprinted in 146
Cong Rec E1939-02, at El939 (2000)).
Letter from Chicago Board of Trade, Chicago Mercantile Exchange and Sullivan & Cromwell, to
Congress (Oct. 19, 2000), (reprinted in 146 Cong. Rec. E1939-02, at E1940 (2000)).
CFMA at § 2(8).
US Commodity Futures Trading Commission, Regulation of Over-The-CounterDerivative Transactions7
(1999).
Id at xi.
Id at 23-24.
Bank for International Settlements, Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems: New Developments in
Cleating and Settlement Arrangements for OTC Derivatives 6 (Mar 2007), online at
http://www.bis.org/publ/cpss77.htm (visited Dec 1, 2009).
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relatively non-complex instruments, or to include tiered clearing
arrangements that would allow clearing to extend beyond the inter-dealer
market. 62

The chair of the committee that authored the BIS report was Timothy F.
Geithner, then President of the New York Federal Reserve.
A decade after their earlier deregulatory intervention,63 the PWG and
Congress returned to OTC derivatives regulation. In a report issued on March
13, 2008, just days before Bear Stearns collapsed, the PWG issued a policy
statement recommending improvements in the financial infrastructure. Its
recommendation with respect to trading of OTC derivatives was, like the 2007
BIS report, relatively mild: "Supervisors should ask the industry to develop a
longer-term plan for an integrated operational infrastructure supporting OTC
derivatives that," inter alia, "enhances participants' ability to manage counterparty
risk through netting and collateral agreements by promoting standardization and
interoperability of infrastructure components. 64 The recommendations were
framed for the entire OTC derivative market, without distinguishing CDS. In
fact, neither the words "credit default swap" nor "credit derivative" appeared in
the document. The following month, the Financial Stability Forum (since
expanded and renamed as the Financial Stability Board) echoed the PWG's
conclusions with respect to OTC derivatives, almost verbatim.65 Neither the
PWG nor the Financial Stability Forum recommended a CCP clearinghouse.

62

Id.
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During the intervening decade, a few noted the risks emerging in the system. A paper by

64

McKinsey consultants, for example, worried that "the growing use of credit derivatives is
transferring risks on an increasingly large scale in ways that are mostly opaque to investors and
regulators." Arno Gerken and Hugh Karseras, The Real Risks of Credit Derivatives, 4 McKinsey Q
128 (2004); Frank Partnoy and David A. Skeel, Jr, Debt as a Lever of Control The Promise And Perils
Of Credit Derivatives, 75 U Cin L Rev 1019 (2007) ("Because many investors . .. place highly
leveraged bets on credit default swaps, even a relatively small market change could trigger a crisis
of the sort that Long Term Capital Management threatened to unleash when it collapsed in 1998.
The rush to unwind a vast array of interconnected contracts could create serious liquidity
problems in the financial markets. Given the size of the market, a crisis involving credit
derivatives would cause convulsions throughout the international financial markets. Thus,
although credit default swaps can diminish systemic risk ...the market also has the potential to
cause precisely the opposite effect.").
The President's Working Group on Financial Markets, Poligy Statement on Financial Market

65

Developments 19 (Mar 2008), online at http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/reports/
pwgpolicystatemktturmoil_03122008.pdf (visited Dec 1, 2009).
Financial Stability Forum, Report of the FinancialStabilio Forum on Enhancing Market and Institutional
Resilience 21 (Apr 7, 2008) ("The financial industry should develop a longer-term plan for a reliable
operational infrastructure supporting OTC derivatives . . . .Such an infrastructure should .. .
enhance participants' ability to manage counterparty risk through netting and collateral
agreements by promoting portfolio reconciliation and accurate valuation of trades ... ).
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However, any hesitancy among regulators would disappear with the dramatic
meltdowns at Bear Stearns, Lehman, and AIG.
After the Federal Reserve's intervention to support Bear Stearns by
guaranteeing billions in losses upon J.P. Morgan's acquisition of the failing
enterprise in March 2008, attention turned to CDS. Many had purchased CDS
against the risk of Bear Stearns failure; if Bear Stearns failed, those who had
written these CDS contracts would have to make good on them. Furthermore,
Bear Stearns had itself written many CDS contracts, selling protection to others.
If Bear Stearns failed, these CDS would be worthless. Adding to the alarm, Bear
Stearns was "a giant in the over-the-counter derivatives market, and number one
by a long way in credit-default swaps." 66 The possibility of a ripple effect from
Bear Stearns' failure prompted the federal rescue:
One of the reasons why the risk of Bear Stearns imploding scared market
participants and regulators so much was that it would have led to hundreds
of thousands of CDS defaulting-both those that had Bear as a reference
credit and contracts in which it was a counterparty. This is 67
thought to be
one of the main reasons why the Fed intervened to save Bear.
Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke noted that "the sudden failure of Bear
Stearns likely would have led to a chaotic unwinding of positions" in a range of
critical markets. 6' The aftershock of the failure of a big dealer could be worse
than the failure itself.
The authorities turned to CCP clearing as one remedy to the problem they
had encountered with Bear Stearns. The New York Federal Reserve, led by
Timothy Geithner, began urging financial institutions to move to CCP clearing:
"Since the near-collapse of Bear Stearns 10 weeks ago, the focus of the New
York Fed in its efforts to reform the CDS market has changed from urging
banks to improve trade confirmation to creating a central clearing house."69
Pressure for reform was growing outside government. In April, international
financier George Soros declared "an urgent need for a clearing house or
exchange where these trades are registered and settled according to wellestablished rules.", 70 Describing the ripple effect of counterparty default as "a
Damocles sword that is bound to fall," Soros called for "the establishment of a
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CDS Market, Euroweek 64 (June 13, 2008).
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2008), online at http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601087&sid =a7coicThgaEE&
refer=home (visited Dec 1, 2009).
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clearing house or exchange for credit default swaps" in a book published in May
2008.71
In a report issued in August 2008, a consortium of leading dealers also
observed the virtues of CCP clearing for credit derivatives:
A robust CCP can significantly benefit the stability of the credit derivatives
market by creating a shock absorber to lessen the impact of a default by a
major participant in the market. A CCP will also fit well into the existing
market infrastructure and 72add to the overall efficiency of risk-reducing
efforts within the industry.
The House Agriculture Committee held hearings on derivatives in September
2008, followed by the Senate Agriculture Committee the following month.
Because clearinghouses began approaching various US regulators for
authorization to begin clearing CDS, the principal regulators (the Federal
Reserve, the SEC, and the CFTC) entered into a Memorandum of
Understanding regarding CDS central counterparties.73
The first legislative proposal appeared in late 2008. In November, Senator
Tom Harkin unveiled the "Derivatives Trading Integrity Act," which would
force all OTC derivatives, including CDS, onto exchanges.74 Other legislative
proposals followed in 2009. Congressman Colin Peterson introduced the
Derivatives Markets Transparency and Accountability Act of 2009 on February
11,

2009. 7 1 Congressman

Mike Castle

introduced

the

Financial

System

Stabilization and Reform Act of 2009 on March 26, 2009.76 On May 4, 2009,
Senators Carl Levin and Susan Collins introduced the "Authorizing the
Regulation of Swaps Act. 7 7 In introducing the bill, Senators Levin and Collins

71

Soros, New ParadigmforFinandalMarketsat 145 (cited in note 25).

72

Counterparry Risk Management Policy Group, Containing Systemic Risk: The Road to Reform 125-26
(Aug 6, 2008), online at http://www.crmpolicygroup.org/index.html (visited Dec 1, 2009).
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Board Of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, the U.S. Commodity Futures Trading
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for Credit Default Swaps (Nov 14, 2008); Heather Landy, Credit Default Swaps Oversight Nears,
Washington Post D3 (Nov 15, 2008).
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Sarah N. Lynch, Harkin Seeks to Force All Derivalives Onto Exchanges, Wall Street Journal (Nov 20,
2008), online at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122721812727545583.html (visited Dec 1,
2009); Derivatives Trading Integrity Act of 2009, S 272, 111th Cong. (2009).
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explained that the statutory and regulatory exemptions granted to derivatives had
proven to be a mistake.78
On March 26, 2009, Secretary Timothy Geithner introduced the
Administration's framework for comprehensive regulatory reform of the
financial regulatory system, and the Administration followed on June 17 with a
white paper on the subject.7 9 With respect to CDS, the Administration
To contain systemic risks, the CEA
recommended extensive CCP clearing:
and the securities laws should be amended to require clearing of all standardized
OTC derivatives through regulated CCPs. To make these measures effective,
regulators would need to require that CCPs impose robust margin requirements
as well as other necessary risk controls and that customized OTC derivatives are
not used solely as a means to avoid using a CCP.8 ° These recommendations were
embodied in the Administration's draft OTC Derivatives Reform legislation,
introduced August 11, 2009.81
Senator Jack Reed introduced the Comprehensive Derivatives Regulation
of
2009 on September 22, 2009.82 On October 2, 2009, Congressman
Act
Barney Frank introduced the Over-the-Counter Derivatives Markets Act of
2009.83 On November 10, 2009 Senator Dodd introduced the comprehensive
Restoring American Financial Stability Act of 2009, which sought to "push most
derivatives trading onto exchanges, in an effort to improve transparency and
market stability."8 4 All of these bills referred extensively to the Administration's
78

155 Cong Rec S961, $5067-$5085 (statement of Sen Levin) ("[The] prohibition [on the regulation
of swap transactions] has never made any sense; it helped cause the financial crisis that is
engulfing the American economy....").
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titeVII.pdf (visited Dec 1, 2009).
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August 11 draft, and all sought to move CDS to central clearing, with broader or
narrower exceptions.
On December 23, 2008, the SEC granted LCH.Clearnet a temporary
exemption to allow it to operate as a CCP for CDS.8" The SEC granted ICE
Trust a similar exemption on March 6, 2009,86 and granted one to the Chicago
Mercantile Exchange Inc (CME) and Citadel Investment Group, LLC on March
13, 2009 to operate a combined clearing and electronic trading facility for
CDS.87 ICE Trust began clearing CDS on Markit CDX indices on March 9,
2009, thus becoming the first CCP to do so in the US.88 On June 2, 2009, major
financial market participants committed to provide their standardized CDS
clients with access to a CCP no later than December 15, 2009.89 Both ICE and
CME announced intentions to begin clearing customer transactions on or before
this deadline. 90
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Related to Central Clearing of Credit Default Swaps, and Request for Comments, Release No 3459527 File No S7-05-09 (Mar 6, 2009), online at http://www.sec.gov/rules/exorders/2009/3459527.pdf (visited Dec 1, 2009).
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Default Swaps Initiaive to Additional Partners and Focuses Solution on Clearing Services (Sept 18, 2009)
online at http://cmegroup.mediaroom.com/index.php?s=43&item=2931 (visited Dec 1, 2009).
Gordon Platt, ICE Begins Clearing Credit Default Swaps as Counterparty Risk Hits Record High,
23(4) Global Finance 64 (Apr 2009).
Federal Reserve Bank of New York, New York Fed Welcomes Further Industry Commitments on Over
the-Counter Derivatives (June 2, 2009), online at http://www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents
/news/markets/2009/ma090602.html (visited Dec 1, 2009).
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(Oct 5, 2009) online at http://ir.theice.com/releasedetail.cfm?ReleaselD=413610 (visited Dec 1,
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Reuters
(Oct 21,
2009),
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III. THE EUROPEAN REGULATORY RESPONSE
Even though CDS were pioneered by Americans in the 1990s, 91 they
quickly became popular in Europe. A European Central Bank (ECB) study
suggests that 41 percent of CDS index products in January 2009 were based on
European reference entities (namely, iTraxx Europe), 37 percent of CDS
contracts were written on European corporations or sovereigns in March 2009,
and that 39 percent of CDS were denominated in Euros in 2007.92 While high
profile CDS-related failures had occurred in the US, the European authorities
recognized the risks associated with CDS as their own.
In Europe, CCPs were hardly a novel idea first conceived post-Lehman.
They had long been employed in a variety of transactions.9 3 In 2001, the ECB's
Governing Council concluded, with respect to both securities and derivatives,
that "[o]wing to the potential systemic importance of securities clearing and
settlement systems, the Eurosystem has an interest in CCP clearing and
considers that it is essential to establish, in co-operation with the other relevant
authorities, effective risk management standards."9 4 The recommendation was
far from definitive, however. There was uncertainty about the appropriate
infrastructure, with some proposing a single CCP covering equities, bonds,
derivatives and commodities.9" Even if the ECB was not certain about the
details, it clearly declared its preference for a CCP established within the
Eurozone, a preference that would be repeated post-Lehman.96
In April 2008, on the heels of the Bear Stearns debacle and following a

longer period of financial market turmoil, the Financial Stability Forum, a
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report of the Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems ("CPSS' of the central banks of
the Group of Ten countries and the Technical Committee of the International Organization of
Securities Commissions ("IOSCO")).
European Central Bank, Press Release: The Enroystem's Poliy Line with Regard to Consolidation in
Central Counterparty Clearing (Sept 27, 2001), online at http://www.ecb.int/press/pr/date/2001/
html/pr010927_2.en.html (visited Dec 1, 2009) (with accompanying explanatory note).
Id.
Id ("The natural geographical scope for any 'domestic' market infrastructure (including central
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working group of financial regulators from leading economies, offered its report
for "enhancing market and institutional resilience." 9 7 While the report suggested
standardization of credit derivatives and promoted managing "counterparty risk
through netting and collateral agreements," it did not call for a CCP
98
clearinghouse for credit derivatives.
In the wake of the financial crisis, Europe quickly embraced the notion of a
CCP clearinghouse for CDS-with the additional caveat that it be located in
Europe. As we shall see, the European authorities, ranging from the ECB, the
European Commissioner for Internal Market and Services, the European
Council, to the UK's Financial Services Authority (FSA), and even the European
Parliament, declared their support for a European clearinghouse for CDS.
After Lehman's demise in September 2008, the urgency and specificity of
support for a CCP for CDS grew. In the multilateral setting of the Financial
Stability Forum, based in Basel, there was agreement in October 2008 on the
need for CCP-based clearing: "In view of market developments, it is important
that market participants press ahead with their commitments to improve the
OTC credit derivatives markets, including putting in place CCP clearing
arrangement in the near future."99 The language urged voluntary efforts, though
the thought of a possible mandate could not have been far away.
In October 2008, the European Commissioner for Internal Market and
Services, Charles McCreevy, called a meeting with industry and European
regulators to spur "concrete proposals as to how the risks from credit derivatives
can be mitigated."' 0 0 Commissioner McCreevy embraced CCPs for CDS, saying
that while CDS standardization was important, "there is a far more pressing
need and that is to have a central clearing counterparty for these derivatives."''"
The ECB position became more insistent as to the need for a CCP over
the next few months. In November, the Governing Council of the ECB
declared:
The Eurosystem shares the views of the Financial Stability Forum and of
the European Commission on the importance of reducing counterparty risk
and of enhancing transparency in OTC derivatives markets, especially in
those parts of the market that are of systemic importance (e.g. credit
derivatives, including credit default swaps). There are a number of initiatives
97
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the introduction of centralised
aiming to achieve these goals through
10 2
clearing solutions for OTC derivatives.
By December, the Governing Council of the ECB concluded that "there was a
need for at least one European CCP for credit derivatives and that, given the
potential systemic importance of securities clearing and settlement systems, this
infrastructure should be located within the euro area. ' '
That same month, the Economic and Financial Affairs Council of the EU
declared its support for one or more European CCPs for OTC derivatives
markets and went further to encourage global coordination on the reforms. The
Council declared that it:
SUPPORTS the declaration made by the European Commission on the
financial stability challenge posed by the growing scale of OTC derivatives
exposure and in particular credit derivatives and the need to support
appropriate initiatives to reduce those risks, notably by developing, as a first
step and as a matter of urgency, the creation of one or more European CCP
and ENCOURAGES
clearing capacities in OTC derivatives markets,
04
coherence with parallel initiatives at global level.'
The leading domestic British regulator, the FSA, added to the regulatory
approach by declaring in November 2008 that the UK's market abuse regulatory
regime applied to CDS.'0 5 This signaled its willingness to assert its regulatory
authority more generally over the market. Also in 2008, the FSA began the
process of approving applications by private parties to provide CCP clearing
services for OTC derivatives. By March 2009, the FSA publicly declared its
support for CCP clearing in the CDS market. The FSA's review of the financial
crisis, led by head Adair Turner, included one recommendation pointing directly
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to CDS trading: "Clearing and CCP systems should be developed to cover the
10 6
standardised contracts which account for the majority of CDS trading."'
The European Commission has taken the lead role in crafting a European
response. A staff report for the European Commission, tided "Ensuring
Efficient, Safe and Sound Derivatives Markets," made perhaps the most
systematic official case for a CCP clearinghouse for CDS to date. 07 The report
enumerated the reasons for a CCP clearing structure for derivatives and declared
such a structure especially urgent for CDS. "Most other derivatives," the staff
concluded, "appear less risky" than CDS. 1°8 Shortly after the publication of the
staff report, the European Commission began a public consultation on "possible
initiatives to enhance the resilience of OTC derivatives markets."' 0'9 It received
111 responses, ranging from private individuals to the World Bank.10 The great
bulk of the responses embraced the idea of a CCP clearinghouse, though many
differed over the details, including how to incentivize clearing through CCPs
rather than bilaterally.
By 2009, the initial enthusiasm for CCP clearing for CDS had only become
stronger. The embrace of CCP clearing encompassed not only CDS regulators
but also CDS dealers. While existing clearinghouses for other securities and
derivatives were busy building new clearinghouses for CDS, it remained less
than certain what percentage of CDS clearing these houses would attract.
Pressure from EU authorities, especially the European Commission, helped
push the clearing solution. From October 2008 onwards, Commissioner
McCreevy repeatedly demanded that the industry move towards CCP clearing.
The following January, he was apparently dissatisfied with the progress, causing
him to issue a "terse comment" through a spokesman: "We haven't got a
commitment to move to central clearing.., so now we feel that since there isn't
the engagement by the industry, the project as such has failed and, therefore, the
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Commission has to consider the appropriate next steps.'
In February 2009,
nine dealers sent a letter to European Commissioner McCreevy committing to
the use of a European CCP for European CDS by July 31, 2009.112
The threat of regulation was the tactic used to spur private action.
"Regulators brandish weapons," a headline in a major European financial
markets newspaper declared in March 2009.113 The Commission set a deadline
of July 31, 2009 for clearing eligible European CDS through a CCP. On July 3,
2009, with some uncertainty about whether the deadline would be met, the
Commission reiterated its warning:
Overall, as of today [document dated July 3, 2009], it is too early to judge
whether the dealers' efforts will be enough to respect the commitment to
clear eligible European CDS by 31 July 2009. Given the threat to financial
stability, ifit was not re.pected, other ways to reach the same objective would have to be
114

found.

By July 31, two CCPs, ICE Clear Europe and Eurex Credit Clear, had obtained
the necessary regulatory approvals for clearing European CDS. These two CCPs
launched in July, days before the Commission deadline:
ICE Clear Europe, operated by Adanta-based Intercontinental Exchange
(Ice), has so far outstripped rival Eurex Credit Clear, owned by Frankfurtbased derivatives exchange Eurex. By August 21, Ice Clear Europe had
cleared 2,422 transactions, totalling EUR146.4 billion of notional, and had
11 dealers as direct clearing members. By contrast, Eurex Credit Clear had
attracted only two members, Nomura and UniCredit, and by August 21 had
5
cleared just three transactions, totalling EUR85 million."
ICE Clear Europe's success was due in part to the fact that it was dealersupported and had an affiliate precedent in CDS clearing-the ICE Trust US
clearing platform, which had launched on March 9, 2009.116 On July 31,
Commissioner McCreevy heralded the CCP developments: "Clearing through
central counterparties (CCPs) is key to improving risk management and to
increasing the stability of the financial system. I am pleased the extraordinary
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efforts by the industry and service providers have made it possible that two
European CCPs are starting to clear these products.""' 7
IV. WHY CONVERGENCE?
Why did regulators on both side of the Atlantic come to see CCP clearing
for CDS as a key to reforming the global financial architecture? Henry
Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman describe a number of mechanisms by which
convergence on a regulatory model might occur: "There are, broadly speaking,
three ways in which a model of corporate law can come to be recognized as8
''
superior: by force of logic, by force of example, and by force of competition."
While Hansmann and Kraakman speak of corporate law, these mechanisms can
also have effect in other areas of law. The force of example drove a search for a
new regulatory regime: with the advent of the credit crisis, the principal
alternative model to CCP clearing-favoring deregulation because of presumed
market sophistication-was now seen as a failure, inadequate to the task of
assuring well-capitalized CDS counterparties with adequate risk management. It
was then the force of logic that served as the principal mechanism driving
convergence in the regulation of credit derivatives. Indeed, the survey of the
regulatory response to CDS-associated failures above suggests that regulators in
Brussels and Washington came to see CCP clearing as a crucial bulwark against a
future derivatives implosion. Regulators saw the potential value of a CCP in
helping to contain the risks of credit derivatives without suffocating the
enormous market in such derivatives.
Anne-Marie Slaughter and Harold Koh have also identified transnational
networks and other norm proponents as key to national convergence upon a
global legal norm." 9 Indeed, we see these transnational forces at work with
117
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respect to CDS clearing. Transnational networks of regulators and transnational
institutions, both public and private, have played a key role in supporting and
elaborating the reform. The European response was formulated primarily at the
supranational regional level in Brussels, rather than in national capitals.
We find alternative explanations less compelling. Hansmann and
Kraakman identify two other potential forces that might lead towards
convergence: "explicit efforts at cross-border harmonization, and competition
among jurisdictions for corporate charters."' 120 Convergence did not arise
through competitive pressures to match a foreign regulatory regime, or through
coercive pressures applied by one country upon foreign regulators.
Why did regulators embrace CCP clearing for CDS? What role did
transnational networks play in this process? The sections below explain the logic
of CCP clearing and the crucial role of transnational networks in the process of
regulatory convergence. We also offer some preliminary observations about
similarities and differences in the regulatory process leading to convergence in
the US and Europe. We conclude by noting the need for coordination in
promulgating some of the details in the regulation to prevent regulatory leakage.
A. The Compelling Logic of CCP Clearing
The collapse of AIG and Lehman revealed that OTC derivatives, a sector
of the financial markets that was largely unregulated and had grown to dizzying
heights, could be a leading factor in the failure of a major market participant and
cause the failure of one market participant to drag many others down. The
bailout of AIG burdened taxpayers with enormous costs for the actions of a
few, and the decision by the government not to bail out Lehman sent
shockwaves through global credit markets. The fact that OTC derivatives were
unregulated meant the government had few tools to predict the collapse of these
institutions, to intervene to prevent such collapses, or even to recognize fully the
dimensions of the fallout from their failure. The crisis made it clear that the
unregulated market alone, grown to the size it had, did not have sufficient
internal safeguards to prevent further collapses. Contrary to the deregulatory
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moves of the prior decade, regulators now concluded that the credit derivatives
market did not have sufficient mechanisms to discipline itself.,21
At the same time, regulators did not feel it prudent to regulate so strictly as
to cripple a financial instrument that many private parties (and even the World
Bank 122) found valuable. Thus, in seeking to eliminate the conditions that led to
the fall of AIG and Lehman, regulators faced the challenge of calibrating those
burdens to be adequate to avoid another financial crisis or another public rescue,
but not so heavy as to create undue disruption themselves.
We believe that the convergence of the US and European regulatory
approaches to OTC derivatives regulation reflects parallel efforts to strike this
balance. While both the US and Europe considered a wide range of regulatory
options, a consensus view emerged. Regardless of the diversity of factors and
decisions that ultimately brought AIG and Lehman down, had there been
adequate capital or protected margin associated with these two firms' OTC
derivatives transactions, either they would not have defaulted or the
consequences of their defaults would not have risen to the same systemic level.
In the eyes of the regulators, AIG and Lehman, and arguably many other market
participants, had externalized some portion of the risk they had absorbed by
holding inadequate "reserves" against their potential ongoing obligations, either
in the form of capital or posted margin, held separate from other working
capital. An obligation to hold higher "reserves" would have reduced profits, but
it might also have imposed capital constraints that would have led them to
reduce their exposure. Furthermore, the "reserves" might have increased the
possibility that they could meet their obligations to counterparties, instead of
passing the losses to taxpayers (in the case of AG) and counterparties (in the
case of Lehman). In this manner, imposing capital and margin requirements can
help to internalize the full risks of derivatives contracts across their duration.
Governmental efforts to ensure sufficient "reserves" involve two
components: (1) specific capital and margin rules on OTC derivatives
transactions, and (2) mandates to clear the greatest possible proportion of OTC
derivatives exposure through regulated central counterparties where such capital
and margin rules are operationalized. Imposition of capital and margin levels is a
tool well known to the regulators, but it has its drawbacks. How will regulators
know they have set appropriate levels and adjusted them properly over time to
reflect market conditions and market innovation? If too high, they threaten to
damage market efficiency; if too low, they will not have their intended
121
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preventive effect. In addition, there is a huge volume of derivatives trading done
with non-regulated entities. How can regulators capture this flow, without
claiming jurisdiction over market participants who otherwise would fall outside
financial regulatory oversight?
CCPs offer a regulated market-based framework for administering capital
and margin discipline. Through CCPs, capital rules, and margin rules, regulators
can seek to find compromise among the wide range of constituencies and
market participant interests. A CCP serves as a neutral counterparty with
expertise in market risk management and primary business incentives to prevent
default and to ensure that, if there is default, all transactions are adequately
collateralized.
For regulators, a CCP offers a number of advantages:
1. Customersegregation andportability. The isolation of customer positions
and margin from the insolvency of a CM could eliminate the Lehman
risk.
2. Netting. Offsetting positions in standardized cleared contracts are
immediately netted, as compared to bilateral offsetting positions with
different counterparties which cannot be collapsed. Netting of
positions would lead to reduction of overall exposure, which in turn
would lead to commensurate reduction of both counterparty
exposures and financing and capital requirements for holding the same
risk. This benefits not only participants, but the system as a whole.
3. Margining/risk management independence and consisteny. The CCP maintains
a continuous pricing and mark-to-market discipline. As noted in the
Lehman example, a CCP establishes margin based on the inherent risk
of the instrument, and is not engaged as a trading entity with trading
relationships that might influence credit decisions. The CCP constantly
and neutrally assesses the counterparty risk of CMs, as well as
customers across multiple CMs. It has the ability to assess additional
margin from such CMs and customers, and to impose clearing limits.
It also has the ability to assess concentration risk, for one customer
across multiple CMs or across the systems as a whole, and take
preventive measures. The CCP not only ensures that variation margin
is conducted using best available market pricing, but it continuously
recalibrates and requires participants to adjust the initial margin
amount to reflect changes in price and risk, an adjustment that is
typically not conducted in the bilateral market.
4. Mutualizationfund.In a well-managed CCP, default by one party does
not reverberate through the system, bringing down counterparties, and
then their counterparties, in a domino effect. This is because such
losses will be absorbed through a pre-funded mutualization structure,
into which the CCP may require CMs to contribute additional capital
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over time to adjust for increases in risk. This minimizes the risk of
government bailouts in default, and provides for an orderly workout
with minimal market disruption. The successful workouts of Lehman
futures and interest rate swaps described above offers a recent example
of successful default management.' 23
5. Traniparengy. CCPs provide data capture, data reporting, and end of day
settlement prices-useful for both regulators and market participants
in anticipating and managing risk.
6. Capitalbenefits. Because CCPs have better credit quality than individual
market participants, dealer CMs transacting with such counterparties
may see capital adequacy benefits.
7. A locusfor regulation.A CCP provides a locus for regulation. If most
trades occur through a limited number of platforms, regulators will
find it easier to monitor compliance with regulation. By contrast, it is
more difficult to monitor the collection and sufficiency of margin
requirements on bilateral trades that could occur anywhere, anytime.
An overarching goal achieved by a CCP is the internalization of risk. The
Lehman failure demonstrated that the bilateral system, if inadequately capitalized
or collateralized, exposes the investor to the credit risk of its counterparty, and
similarly exposes the entire financial system to that risk, with the potential for a
domino effect through interconnected obligations. The CCP, on the other hand,
creates a hub-and-spoke structure out of the bilateral web that isolates both the
investor and the system from this risk and ensures sufficient collateralization.
CCPs offer a framework to help ensure that each trade is sufficiently
collateralized through margin and regulatory capital. Where there is sufficient
margin held in a regulated central clearinghouse, regulatory capital burdens could
be eased to reflect the reduction in counterparty and systemic risk. Conversely,
where a trade is not cleared and thus not assured of being collateralized within a
regulated structure, regulators have widely sought to increase regulatory capital
or bilateral margin in order to offer similar levels of protection to the financial
system. Sufficiently high levels of regulatory capital set against bilateral trades
should help ensure that dealers have enough in "reserve" to absorb losses,
thereby mitigating the risk of default in the first place. If a dealer default were to
occur, the "reserve" would help reduce counterparty losses.
Critics of CCPs argue that CCPs concentrate risk, creating a singular point
of failure. While the risk of CCP failure cannot be discounted, there is reason to
think that the risk will be better managed than in a bilateral market. The risk that
a CCP faces can be decomposed into two risks: the market risk that any trade
that it has entered into will become a bad bet; and the counterparty risk that the
123
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counterparty to any trade will prove unable to meet its obligations. A CCP is
perfectly hedged on every market risk, as it has an equal and opposite trade for
every exposure it holds. The CCP's primary focus is therefore on managing
counterparty risk, for which it imposes margin requirements, which it adjusts
constantly. Furthermore, the CCP accepts only liquid contracts for clearing to
ensure that in the event of a default the CCP can rapidly dispose of its positions.
Finally, the CCP has a mutualization fund and default management procedures.
In effect, a CCP can turn to its CMs for a bail out, rather than to the taxpayer. It
is important to recognize that Bear, Lehman, and AIG also each concentrated
risk-they served as defacto unregulated central clearing counterparties, without
the disciplines of a regulated CCP.
There will be risks that remain outside the scope of the central
counterparty clearing. For example, AIG's CDS portfolio was concentrated on
mortgage-related products, like collateralized debt obligations, for which no
clearing facilities yet exist. Only a stricter capital and margin discipline would
have helped. However, standardized and highly liquid corporate CDS represents
the vast bulk of risk in the market, and these could be cleared. 2 4
If CCPs provide such numerous benefits, why have the private derivatives
markets not moved to them absent government pressure? As already indicated,
dealers have incentives to prefer the status quo. First, CCPs publish actual
transaction prices at least once per day, reducing the informational advantage the
dealers hold in the bilateral market. Further, because parties transact through a
CCP knowing that they will not face bilateral counterparty risk because their
counterparty from the onset will be the CCP, they will be indifferent to the
identity of their trade execution counterparty, creating the foundation for
anonymous electronic trading, such as an exchange that further increases price
transparency. The reduction of dealer banks' informational, "balance sheet" and
informational advantages enables new entrants to compete for market share and
also reduces per trade revenue through tighter bid-offer spreads. In addition, in
the bilateral markets dealers typically do not post initial margin to their buy-side
counterparties because, as capital supervised and rated entities, they were before
the crisis of 2008 viewed as having a minimal risk of default. They do, however,
collect initial margin from the bulk of their buy-side counterparties, monies that
they may redeploy to finance their own activities. In a centrally cleared system,
dealers must post initial margin on each of their trades and can no longer use
their customers' initial margin, which instead is held in segregated accounts.
Certain corporate end-users of derivatives, while supportive of having the
option to clear, have separately argued against mandatory clearing for fear that
their costs of utilization of derivatives contracts may increase. They express
124
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concern that dealers may seek to pass on a share of higher capital costs in a CCP
to them. Some end-users have not historically been required to post either initial
or variation margin. While the choice to waive margin represents an extension of
credit by the dealers, the cost of which may be included in the transaction costs
for the CDS, end-users may still view the need to post margin as a less favorable
deployment of capital.
Regulators are aware that there is commercial resistance to CCP clearing.
The European Commission observed this in July 2009:
Incentives to use CCPs already exist. Market participants have a natural
incentive to use CCP clearing, as it reduces their counterparty credit risk and
allows regulatory capital savings. However, these incentives have not been
sufficient in overcoming commercial incentives favouring bilateral clearing.
Therefore, the Commission is considering ways to significantly strengthen
the incentives to use CCP clearing so as to dismantle
any commercial
hesitation to take up CCP clearing wherever possible. 125
B. The Role of Transnational Networks
Many transnational players proved crucial in the CDS regulation story.
Networks of official financial regulators, as well as networks of private financial
actors, provided technical know-how and coordinated the restructuring of the
global financial markets to accommodate CDS clearing.
Many of the CDS dealers were private financial institutions that operated
on both sides of the Atlantic, and thus were themselves transnational players.
There were also clearinghouses from London to Chicago keen on expanding the
instruments they cleared. Existing clearinghouses for other products such as
ICE, CME, and LCH.Clearnet sought to expand their services by creating new
clearinghouses for CDS. ICE and CME, based in the US, set out to erect
clearinghouse facilities for CDS on both sides of the Atlantic. This effort to
expand into CDS clearing began even before the Lehman failure. The
clearinghouses represent the supply-driven part of the market. The demanddriven push for CDS CCP clearinghouses has been more muted, even though
there is widespread agreement that CCP clearinghouses should reduce risk for
CDS buyers and sellers as well as lower dealer margins, in part because of the
fragmentation of the buy-side relative to the concentrated number of major
dealers in the market.
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The clearinghouses themselves sought approvals from the relevant
regulatory authorities, including the Federal Reserve and the FSA.'2 6 But
building a clearinghouse by itself could not insure that parties would clear trades
there. In the absence of regulatory compulsion, private dealers have remained a
critical force in the realization of clearing operations. Their support for ICE, in
which they had a significant stake, permitted it to come to market quickly. As
noted above, dealers committed to both European and American regulators to
move major portions of their CDS to CCP clearinghouses. The group of dealers
who made this commitment included banks from both sides of the Atlantic.
Transnational private networks such as International Swap Dealers
Association (ISDA) also proved crucial. ISDA led the effort to standardize CDS,
a necessary prerequisite to CCP clearing. These included a "big bang" and a
"small bang," two events in which market participants simultaneously agreed to
modify CDS contracts prospectively and retroactively to conform to
standardized terms.127 The first such standardization was in April 2009, when the
CDS market underwent a "big bang" in the form of a retroactively imposed
modification to CDS contracts. 128 This change was undertaken by ISDA with
more than 2,000 market participants adhering to the protocol. 129 The "big bang"
globally standardized the dispute resolution process in the event of a claim of
default or bankruptcy. ISDA's "big bang" also "established determinations
committees for five geographical areas: the Americas, EMEA [Europe, the
Middle East and Africa], Japan, Asia excluding Japan, and Australia and New
Zealand."'"3 These committees are charged with determining whether a default
has occurred, thus triggering CDS coverage.
Public transnational institutions played a key role in the reforms as well.
Multilateral financial institutions such as the BIS provided important technical
advice, as did less formal international networks of regulators such as IOSCO.
The BIS itself relied on delegates from national regulators, including, as chair of
its 2007 committee considering derivatives clearing, Timothy Geithner, then of
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the Federal Reserve Bank of New York.' The BIS added CDS to its triennial
survey of financial instruments in 2004, increasing information about the growth
of these instruments. In November of that year, the BIS Settlements Committee
on Payments and Settlement System, working with the Technical Committee of
13 2
IOSCO, issued a joint report titled Recommendations for Central Counterparties.
These fifteen recommendations have proven influential as new CCPs have been
formed for credit derivatives.
The ECB and the Committee of European Securities Regulators (CESR)
had established a joint working group in 2001 to cooperate in the field of
securities clearing and settlement. In light of the financial turmoil of 2007 and
early 2008, the European Council's Economic and Financial Affairs Council
(Ecofin) in June 2008 invited this ECB/CESR working group to adapt and
finalize their earlier draft.'33 In May 2009, the working group published
R,,nmmendations for Securities Settlements Systems and Recommendations for Central
Counterparties in 34the European Union, further developing the BIS
recommendations. 1
C. Process
Converging on a single solution, the European and American approaches
shared some important similarities in process, but also some important
differences. In both jurisdictions, jawboning by regulators proved a crucial and
successful feature of reform. Financial authorities in both jurisdictions called for
private movement towards CCP clearing, and dealers consented, moving a
portion of their clearing to clearinghouses. Two features of the CDS market
made this approach especially effective. First, the industry is marked by
significant concentration. There are only a dozen or so major dealers in CDS.
Second, financial regulators have substantial authority even outside official
regulatory command. Financial regulators exert such authority in part through
the regulation of capital adequacy and through their role as lender of last resort.
This enabled regulators to move the private markets quickly towards CCP
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clearing. In addition, dealers might have cooperated in part to demonstrate the
feasibility of a private solution and thereby head off more restrictive legislation.
Some differences in process too are notable. In Europe, the executive
branch and independent institutions tasked with regulating the financial markets,
not parliamentarians or legislators, led the reforms, with behind-the-scenes input
from national financial authorities. The European Commissioner for Internal
Markets played a key role, as did the ECB. In the US, by contrast, though the
Federal Reserve and the Treasury led initial reform efforts, they were joined by
legislators who quickly offered draft legislation.13
The Europeans produced a number of studies of the problem, especially at
the European Commission and the ECB. 13 6 By contrast, the US authorities
produced fewer white papers. While the Europeans have yet (at the time of
writing) to publish any draft bill or directive, American legislators have produced
a number of detailed legislative proposals. 137 Concerns arose in Europe that the
lengthy European deliberation process risked losing the momentum for reform,
as the crisis fades farther into the past.
The Europeans were more explicitly concerned about ensuring that a
clearinghouse be set up on their soil, while the Americans did not make such
a
13
goal explicit, perhaps because they assumed that it would happen in any case. 1
Perhaps counter-intuitively, the European approach provided a greater
opportunity for private input than the American approach. After it published a
comprehensive staff paper on OTC derivatives, the European Commission in
July 2009 solicited comments from interested stakeholders on ways to
strengthen the derivatives market, seeking comments on reforms to
standardization, central data repositories, CCP clearing, and public trading
venues. 139 It published those submissions authorized for publication on its
website. The hearings in the US congressional committees examining OTC
derivatives also produced thoughtful commentary, but allowed the airing of the
views of but a few invited speakers.
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D. Coordination
Once they embraced central clearing, regulators in Europe and the US saw
the need for international coordination as to the details. The international nature
of the CDS markets became evident in the AIG crisis: CFTC Chairman Gary
Gensler notes, "When the U.S. government first put money into AIG last year,
about two thirds of the first approximately $90 billion flowed through AIG to its
counterparties outside of the United States." 14' Regulators recognized that
differential regulation would spur regulatory avoidance through the simple
expedient of booking the transaction through a more lax jurisdiction. 141 If
European law offers more exceptions to CCP clearing-say for corporate endusers-than US law, it is possible that Americans interested in such transactions
might shift their transactions to Europe. This concern led the Economic and
Financial Affairs Council of the EU to encourage "coherence with parallel
initiatives at global level."' 142 Chairman Gensler observed, "International
coordination is essential to ensure comprehensive regulation of the OTC
derivatives markets. We must not leave gaps in our regulatory structure that
allow traders to evade one country's regulations by taking their business
elsewhere."' 143 The New York Federal Reserve has taken a leading role in
facilitating international regulatory coordination relating to the establishment
and regulation of CCPs, from hosting meetings commencing in the fall of 2008
of CCPs and industry participants and worldwide regulators, to publishing
44
frameworks for regulatory cooperation to promote consistent standards.'
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Not only is there the possibility of regulatory leakage through differential
regulation, there is the fact that counterparties to CDS transactions can hail from
across the world (as the AIG example above demonstrates). A survey of the
geographic distribution of counterparties finds that 46 percent of counterparties
were located in the US and Canada, 24 percent in Western Europe, 20 percent in
the Caribbean, 4 percent in Japan, and 3 percent in Australia. 14 1 It will be easier
to ensure compliance with CDS risk management rules if the home countries of
various parties adhere to consistent international standards. Of course, it is easier
to urge harmonization than to actually agree. Achieving transatlantic agreement
as to the details will undoubtedly prove difficult.
CONCLUSION

Since their introduction in the 1990s, credit default swaps had grown
largely outside regulation to rival the global bond markets in size. The financial
crisis of 2008 revealed that a few financial institutions with enormous CDS
portfolios could bring down counterparties, which would then bring down their
counterparties, and so on in a domino-like fall cascading through the financial
markets. The economic shock of Lehman's collapse and the costs of bailouts led
regulators on both sides of the Atlantic to seek to break this "Too
Interconnected to Fail" paradigm.
Regulators saw that trading in CDS would continue occurring within or
without their jurisdiction because private parties found them a useful mechanism
to manage risk. Regulators thus sought to bring these sectors under control. On
both sides of the Atlantic, safety and soundness of the financial sector were the
overriding objectives, leading them to converge on reforms to CDS clearing as a
mechanism to contain risk. Regulators concluded that erecting well-capitalized
central counterparty clearinghouses with sound risk-management would create a
buffer to weather financial storms. CCPs provide a pool of capital to manage
default, a pool funded not by the government but by market participants.
The examination of the regulation of CDS in multiple jurisdictions allows
us to trace the shifting dynamics in the path of the law thus far-from
competition, to experience, to logic, and ultimately to coordination. Through a
striking process of convergence, regulators in the US and Europe centered their
reform efforts on central counterparty clearing. Where convergence will be the
most tested is in the extent to which the implementation of central clearing is
dependent on legal mandate or market forces.
(Sep 24, 2009), both sources and related materials online at http://www.newyorkfed.org/
newsevents/otc-derivative.htm (visited Dec 1, 2009).
145

ISDA, ISDA Maigin Survy 2009, 9 (2009), online at www.isda.org/c-and-a/pdf/ISDA-MarginSurvey-2009.pdf (visited Dec 1, 2009).

Winter 2010

CJIL

